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Abstract
Security consistently emerges as a top concern with IT administrators and users
when surveyed on transitioning to a cloud infrastructure. To initiate cloud usage,
security concerns must be addressed—however, security and improved usability will be
what keeps the cloud around. We address in this paper security and usability issues and
opportunities with the Department of Defense transitioning to a cloud infrastructure.
The major contributions of this paper are three enablers for a secure and usable
DoD Cloud infrastructure. We also contribute a transition plan for organizations in
terms of four milestones in cloud adoption, assuming that the necessary secure and
usable Cloud infrastructure exists at each milestone. We present three perspectives
throughout the paper: The DoD in designing its Cloud, industry efforts to support the
Cloud, and organizations joining the Cloud.
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1 Overview
The DoD is investigating the issues involved in migrating much of the information pro-
cessing on the NIPRNET to a cloud or multiple cloud infrastructure. The assumption is
that the data and applications for the approximately 3.5 million users would have to be
migrated to this new infrastructure. The assumption is also that the management and
infrastructure savings would more than offset the costs of such a move, while providing
security at least equivalent to the current NIPRNET. In this paper we investigate some of
the security issues that would arise and offer some suggestions as to how to address them.
The DoD Cloud (referred to as “The Cloud”) effort will provide a common storage and
application space to organizations within the DoD. Today, this worries a lot of users and IT
administrators. Only a minority is comfortable with entrusting workflows to a cloud service
parented by any organization, and hosting data in an offsite store raises many concerns.
Security is consistently the top concern–putting all the documents within a massive, off-site
store provokes fears of leaks, unavailability, or tedium in accessing data and services.
The Cloud must supply fundamental (“Necessary, though not necessarily sufficient”)
security policy. When organizations employ the Cloud, the data they place on it and the
practices of use must adhere to its security policies. Getting all organizations’ policies to
work together otherwise is a highly difficult and politics-laden task that grows in personnel
(administrative negotatiors’) work time quadratic to the number of organizations joining1.
All this work would come from getting organizations to agree on basic security policies,
some of which may contradict each other. For instance, user and data management have
many universal security components, users having roles and files having permissions. Plac-
ing the common denominator of security policies within the Cloud saves on negotiations
and allows for basic Cloud services. For instance, all user and data management should
happen through the Cloud.
Good security policy can help prevent surreptitious access to the central document
repository, and be an integral part of preventing damaging leaks such as the Wikileaks
incidents [16]. Defining that policy and its resulting interface is one of the central challenges
in Cloud deployment and adoption. As security should be integral to a system design,
especially at the beginning, we describe here development of the Cloud with an emphasis
on security aspects. As usability is integral to good security, we also describe how the
Cloud can enable usable security.
We describe a particular milestone state as a goal. This state may not be the last state,
or ultimate vision of an organization operating “On the Cloud.” However, it is significant
in its departure from the present state of infrastructure management, and in its attempt
to ease security interactions.
A major goal of the Cloud is to reduce the Email problem: email is the most convenient
1The graph-theoretic representation is as follows: Consider a graph where the nodes are security policies
and the edges between nodes are successful compositions between security policies. Completing this graph
means composing n(n−1)2 policies. n will likely be one or more per organization joining.
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file-sharing mechanism today. Email has significant downsides traded for ease of use: It
removes all technical restrictions on further file propagation; and it generates redundant,
immutable copies of files, wasting space. We intend for the Cloud to reduce the incentives
to use this transfer channel.
From the security infrastructure perspective, this milestone will require significant ad-
vances from the present state of the art in several areas integral to security and everyday
work: authentication, storage, and applications. Designing the Cloud for 3.5 million users
requires distributed data centers and user administration, so we will discuss some of the
technical and policy security implications of this distribution.
1.1 Authentication
A fundamental concern in security is deciding who is trusted to do what. This question
is unanswerable without a sound method of presenting an identity. Organizations have
their own methods of proving identities and capabilities, and their own security labels, but
outside organizational boundaries those policies and labels have to be translated. This
problem, the domain composition problem, has significant administrative and technical
performance issues discussed in Section 2.3.
1.2 Storage
The Cloud should be geographically distributed. There are several reasons for this, most
prominent among them network bandwidth problems and storage capacity. We do not
address networking issues here, but one simple perspective is thinking what happens when
the West Coast arrives at the office and has to pull their virtual desktops in from the
Carolinas – there is a better way.
The storage issue is one of sheer mass of users. The storage must be split because gen-
eral storage at magnitudes of over 104 users is presently unstudied. Leung et al. profiled
storage for a company that had about 1,000 users using a general-purpose storage ser-
vice (users were within the “corporate” groups of the company, versus the “engineering”
groups) [12]. Storage at the scale of 107 users presents such significant issues in data and
metadata management that it will be more feasible to simply distribute the Cloud’s storage
to take advantage of naturally existing delineations, such as organizational boundaries and
geography.
1.3 Applications
Cloud applications present a significant security challenge, in no small part due to their
sources. While there will be some applications that act like web applications, some software
executing on the Cloud will be user-supplied. Those user-supplied applications will be
necessary to perform arbitrary computations on unstructured data, and there is the risk:
If malicious or faulty software breaks out of virtualization layers, the span of that software
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is arbitrary. We must also address what distinct security advantages the Cloud will provide,
in the face of the user’s ability to supply software and data.
The Cloud offers strong advantages in data integrity over today’s DoD computing
environment. Centralizing the data stores for some large-scale Cloud applications means
there will be structural requirements of the data, so there is already a basic understanding
of data integrity. This can be the basis for a Clark-Wilson security model [2], which
describes maintaining integrity in the face of application faults and user fraud. Drusinsky
et al. [3] propose an approach to structuring Cloud data that can greatly aid implementing
a Clark-Wilson model and gaining those integrity advantages.
Containing software and data within the Cloud unifies the security framework, and
make possible some access control and auditing implementations. One implementation,
the managed chain of delegations from user to application to server to data store, will be
possible because of occurring within the Cloud. Also thanks to this Cloud envelopment, the
opportunity to audit accesses and application flow improves over today. Ultimately, while
the risk of consolidating data and applications is high, there are significant improvements
to global system security made possible by consolidating the management and policies.
1.4 Perspectives
The rest of this document describes three perspectives of developing and deploying the
Cloud. First, we outline the DoD needs and policies to specify a successful migration to
the Cloud. Second, we outline what industry efforts must support this migration. Last,
we outline how individual organizations transition to the Cloud close to a prior outline of
transitioning to the vision of Cloud Computing [4].
2 Security specifications of the DoD Cloud
In our deployment milestone, the Cloud must provide an environment matching NIPR-
NET’s isolation. It provides at least Storage and Software as a Service, through the fol-
lowing interfaces:
• The storage interface appears to the user as a file system, allowing general storage
accessible to all users along with specially structured storage accessible by Cloud
applications.
• The file system provides a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) scheme (e.g. cloud:
//cio-nii.defense.gov/Users/).
• The file system allows for a mechanism to reference versions of documents, maintain-
ing an inheritable security definition.
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• The application interface appears similar to a web portal to applications. The file
system interface may not be as appropriate a display mechanism for the portal, as
users see different subsets of these applications.
Security is necessary for consolidating DoD data, so the Cloud must provide a security
policy to which all organizations can adhere. To date, the most global security policy
within the DoD is essentially Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [11]. Unfortunately,
revising this policy, for example in implementing Mandatory Access Control, would likely
delay deployment. Thus, the initial Cloud deployment must provide mechanisms to enforce
DAC, including the following:
• Storage in the form of a large, versioned, distributed file system.
• A single sign-on infrastructure.
• Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that encompasses at least Cloud member organiza-
tions.
• A mechanism to enable simple data sharing.
Data and users associated with an organization are folded in under a domain, with the
term used as presently understood in representing user identities and managing storage
permissions. Miltchev et al. surveyed several production and many research file systems
[13], focusing on administrative overhead involved for sharing data. Their findings indicate
that a 3.5 million user file system with autonomous sharing is beyond the state of the art
in production and research file systems.
We propose here an outline of steps to take to resolve the autonomous delegation prob-
lem, which is a user (or program) delegating their own permission on a resource (e.g.
reading a file) to another user (or program), without having to involve a security adminis-
trator and without violating security policy. Without autonomous delegation, the Cloud’s
lack of usability hinders adoption drastically, and the most usable file sharing is emailing
files as it is today. Email bypasses security definitions on files, and only shares one par-
ticular version of a file at a time, so email is a security fault and a trade of storage space
(for each version) for collaboration. The Cloud must provide some sharing mechanism to
match email in ease, and its architecture can support such a mechanism.
2.1 File system interface
With the Cloud acting as a large network and storage device, the security interface to data
can be viewed as the security portion of a file system interface, where the file system is
mounted as a network share appropriate to the user’s operating system. The NIPRNET
isolation will stem from the file system being accessible (or “attachable,” or “mountable”)
only within the Cloud environment. Names for resources within the Cloud should be defined
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with URIs, which can include version names. It will be an important part of maintaining
data integrity that the Cloud provide data versioning. Security rules, visible as metadata
as they are presented in current file systems, will be set through the normal mechanisms
such as file system GUI dialogs along with others, one of which we describe in this section.
A security (not usability) ideal would be that data that goes into the Cloud should
remain in the Cloud. However, besides working offline, getting data in and out will be
necessary at times. Thus, a reasonable mechanism must exist for data ingest and export,
and DoD must specify policy on what controls data in- and out-flow. Industry must present
the DoD with possibilities for disconnected network operations and trustworthy ingest and
export.
2.2 Data sharing mechanism
Johnson et al. made an economic analogy of file system security policies [9]. They found
that “The failure modes of file systems that enforce centrally-imposed access control poli-
cies are similar to the failure modes of centrally planned economies: individuals either
learn to circumvent these restrictions as matters of necessity or desert the system entirely,
subverting the goals behind the central policy.” They noted the most common mechanism
to circumvent frustrating security policies is email.
The Cloud should make data sharing at least as easy as emailing files around, as one
of its fundamental goals. Since the Cloud is the data repository, and hosts the access
control mechanisms and user identity and roles, it should have the freedom of direction
to allow users to share information better than prior efforts—and there have been many
prior efforts, in production and research file systems. Past file systems have primarily had
problems with sharing data across domains, as noted by Miltchev et al. [13]. The next
section addresses the cross-domain issues.
The mechanism to share files has as its only requirements that it not violate security
policies and that it not be so frustrating it makes users resort to emailing files. We propose
a mechanism here that fits these requirements, and which the Cloud is well-suited to
facilitate.
2.2.1 Proposal for reference attachments
Johnson et al. observed that emailing files to share data satisfies many common security
expectations of a user [9]. We propose reference attachments to embrace this practice with
a subtle alteration: Links are sent instead of entire files. This mechanism for attaching
references acts as a plug-in to the Cloud email clients. It must recognize Cloud URIs, or
generate one from a file reference, and interact with the file system to verify Access Control
List (ACL) modification possibilities, adding names and roles to the ACLs. Because of the
versioning inherent in the storage, these ACLs can be version-specific or time-independent
(e.g. setting up work with a collaborator should allow future reads and writes).
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Email has been the easiest method of sharing files known to user and frustrated security
administrator alike. By sending references to Cloud-stored data instead of files, email is
no longer a target for intercepting sensitive files. The reference does not even count as a
permission token, vulnerable to repurposing or cumbersome to sign: Access to the file is
handled by file system mechanisms and user identity. Intercepting the reference reveals no
more than the resource name. The email is merely a signal that the recipient has access
permission, and a logistic-handler that makes sure the file is ready for the user’s access.
Johnson et al. attempted to implement a mechanism [9]. Unfortunately, the authors
were unable to implement their mechanism on their target file system for reasons specific
to that particular file system and its over-network sharing operations (NTFS). We believe
a Cloud file system with more support than a handful of researchers can implement an
over-email sharing mechanism, regardless of the file system ultimately used as the basis of
Cloud storage.
Industry would have to provide a plugin for each email client to be supported. The
important components of this effort would be the usability of the file reference inclusion
(most users understand drag and drop pretty well), and the file system security interactions
with all of the file access control rules. It must be clear, but unobtrusive, what permissions
a user is granting to a file, and to how many versions.
The ability to identify users, perhaps also according to roles, is an important prerequi-
site to this mechanism. The next section addresses how these users are named.
2.3 Domain composition
Miltchev et al. indicate the strongest factor inhibiting autonomous delegation is a lack of
trust among domains in representing users and their rights to each other, and the admin-
istrative difficulty in establishing that trust [13]. For instance, in a network of domains
where all peer domains are equal, trust relations must be established pairwise between each
domain to allow interaction beyond unauthenticated email (e.g. sharing a file, or running
an application). Many of the better-known forms of access control, such as Role Based
Access Control (RBAC) and Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC), have significant
scalability and consistency issues in cross-domain deployments [10].
Figure 1 shows an example scenario, where a user in a domain D1 wishes to access a
file in domain D3. If the user were a member of domain D3, this would be a simple matter
of checking file permissions against the user’s identifier. However, a user’s identifier is only
recognized within the domain to which the user authenticates. The user john.doe@nps.edu
is recognized within the domain nps.edu, but the domain us.army.mil does not necessarily
know John Doe’s address in NPS – nor does us.army.mil directly know what his valid
roles or attributes are, so the us.army.mil file server does not inherently know whether a
request coming from John Doe is permissible.
The domain composition problem is encapsulated in cross-domain access control. Iden-













Figure 1: Trust relations among administrative domains. Each domain Di has a security manager
server Mi. A user, registered in domain D1 but not registered in D3 has need of file F under D3,
held by Server . However, Server has no trust relation (pictured with a solid line) with D1, so any
request from D1 presenting the user’s identity is rejected.
occurs at the domain level, but in the Cloud users are likely to employ applications or data
lying in other domains. How this is done efficiently and scalably is under current research,
and this is just one piece of access control in general – the other three pieces are authen-
tication, authorization, and access decisions. Karp et al. propose cross-domain resource
requests be made with authorizations, versus the present practice of authentications, and
they explore an authorization-based mechanism [10]. While there are many other issues in
cross-domain security, we focus this section on the identity representation issue: once an
identity is to be presented outside its original domain, the identity should be recognized
Cloud-wide.
If there is an identity-representative trust relation (referred to as a “trust relation”
between organizations) established between two domains, e.g. us.army.mil and nps.edu,
then the two domains trust each other to manage and present identities and roles at least
as well as to themselves. The domains can negotiate this level of trust and capabilities
between each other. However, this approach does not scale if done pairwise between all
domains within the Cloud, as noted in Section 1.
Indirect trust relations need to be addressed at a DoD policy level. Figure 2 illustrates
one possible policy decision, the transitive-closure policy. In the example, the same user
in D1 wishing to access the same file in D3. The two domains don’t have a trust relation













Figure 2: Transitive trust relations among administrative domains. The DoD would need to










Figure 3: Hierarchical trust relations among administrative domains. The DoD would need to
specify that any domain that is a member of the Cloud is capable of presenting identities and roles
at least as well as all other domains within the Cloud.
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policy, organizations choose whom they trust to present identities, and identities can be
forwarded along those chains of trust. This policy would allow organizations to restrict
other organizations’ access to their data, by entire organizations, as policy.
A downside to this policy is that there are other mechanisms to restrict access which
are more appropriate than ignoring an identity representation service. This policy also
potentially induces convoluted graph traversals as personnel attempt to find whether two
organization are reachable in the trust-relation-reachable set. (A social-graph-traversing
mechanism for organizations would likely have to become part of the Cloud in this case.)
The more frequent organizational policy decisions would be simply whether to establish
trust relations and permit transitivity. This approach is likely to not scale to the entire
body of organizations in the DoD.
An alternative policy decision takes advantage of extant infrastructure. Figure 3 illus-
trates the hierarchical trust relation policy. In this policy, each organization that joins the
Cloud adheres to the same minimum set of standards related to identity services, such as
personnel vetting and role assignments. If the DoD policy mandates that certain identity
and role representation practices be a requirement to join the Cloud, then all domains
within the DoD can be trusted to present identities at least as well as one another.
We believe that for identity recognition, the hierarchical policy is preferable to the
transitive-closure policy. For one, identity representation should be within the minimum
policy specification from DoD for Cloud usage. For another, much of the identity infrastruc-
ture already exists: The PKI infrastructure already used in DoD presents a ready-to-use
hierarchy, and the Common Access Card (CAC) infrastructure is already well understood
by the DoD workforce. Finally, the transitive-closure policy presents organizational deci-
sions that can quickly become politically charged: The transitive-closure policy partitions
DoD into cliques of organizations – groups of organizations that are able to agree on identi-
ties only with other members of the clique. Adding other trust relations establishes bridges
between cliques, which inadvertently joins many organizations together. Joining cliques
together then becomes a large negotiating burden on the agencies attempting to establish
mutual identity-recognition services.
We propose that for access control purposes, DAC rules are the point where resource
access decisions are made and enforced – not identity recognition. It is up to the DoD to
decide whether there are other reasons that factor into the identity resolution problem.
2.4 Single sign-on
In the current desktop workflow, users often need to authenticate to many services. Starting
after logging on to their desktop and network, they enter a password for email, others for
web-based services, and perhaps more for other client-server based applications. The intent
of single sign-on is to reduce the number of authenticating actions the user must make to
use Cloud resources down to one or two.














Figure 4: Communication for a user’s work session. The user authenticates to a session manager on
the Cloud via the local workstation. On successful authentication, the user then possesses a security
token representing their work session, that can be forwarded to other Cloud applications. Here,
we illustrate a session with lines representing security communications, the solid lines representing
active use. Service1 is currently employed and Service2 will soon be a part of this user’s session,
without requiring an extra authenticating action (e.g. entering a CAC PIN) from the user. Note:
the location of applications, infrastructure, etc. are transparent to the user.
sitting at their desk, though one is the goal. Within the Cloud, the user should only have
to authenticate once, which would be single sign-on scoped to the Cloud. Authenticating
to the physical workstation or that workstation’s network may have to be a separate au-
thentication. No more than those should be necessary for a self-contained system like the
Cloud; if there are more, it could be detrimental to productivity2.
The Cloud should be able to enable single sign-on by treating the user’s interaction
as in the already-pervasive session network protocol. To illustrate, Figure 4 presents an
authentication model for a Cloud work session. When the user signs on to the Cloud,
their work session begins in an Enterprise Portal displaying their available applications
and perhaps other “Dashboard-style” status reports. A user’s authentication to the Cloud
is represented by a security token, established between the user, the workstation and a
Cloud session manager. Enduring throughout the user’s work session, this token is then
forwarded automatically to whichever service the user requests from the Portal’s landing
page, such as an email application.
2Herley discusses the economic costs of interactions with security mechanisms, with this among his
conclusions: over the entire U.S. population, the threshold of time spent on security interactions before the
U.S. economy is damaged is about one second per user per day, assuming an exploit that affects 1% of users
and costs a total of 10 hours to clean up [6]. The amount of interaction to deem “correct” is a debatable
subject, but there are some measures for “too much.”
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Automated session forwarding is not merely an authentication action. A user request
to use a particular application is a type of authorization of the application to use or attach
to the user’s session, providing end-to-end authorization. End-to-end authorization has
received a lot of attention in the computer systems literature [8]. The implicit authorization
here is a significant security concern, a Service in the Middle attack, where a malicious
service intercepts a user’s credentials and attempts to use them for other purposes.
To ensure that the applications sending and receiving tokens are acting appropriately,
instead of taking other actions on behalf of an unsuspecting user, a Clark-Wilson [2] style
reference monitor must be in place for this authentication forwarding mechanism. This
monitor validates transactions not visible to the user and provides some measure of integrity
to Cloud operations. The DoD must mandate that a monitor of this sort be in place, so
the Cloud can ease authentication yet still prevent hijacked authorizations.
3 Industry efforts
Industry must supply the infrastructure for the Cloud’s user administration and storage.
The identity infrastructure exists in part, but requires much integration. Industry will
have to provide the following:
• Single sign-on within the Cloud system
• An identity management infrastructure
• A large, distributed, versioned file system
• Resiliency to bandwidth spikes, on the scale of all users in a time zone signing on at
the beginning of the workday
3.1 Single sign-on and identity management
Single sign-on, described in Section 2.4, entails having an accepted identity infrastructure.
The present DoD PKI infrastructure, including the CAC, can serve as the identity infras-
tructure for the Cloud. The DoD policy-level decision on transitivity vs. hierarchy for
indirect trust relations (Section 2.3) impacts how the infrastructure is used – for instance,
the transitivity policy could be embodied in allowing cliques to select which intermediary
certificate authorities to trust.
With the CAC infrastructure already present, DoD and industry must work together
to develop a session manager and reference monitor service. This service is a central piece
of the Cloud’s application security, so it needs to be built early on in the adoption of Cloud
Computing.
13
3.2 The Cloud file system
Building a distributed file system that can support an estimated 3.5 million users of unclas-
sified DoD computing presents significant challenges in infrastructure management. The
Cloud storage is to host data and virtual machine environments, so network reliability
will be a paramount concern. Storage security will also provide some application usability
challenges.
The Cloud’s networking must be able to withstand the train arrival problem, where
an entire time zone’s worth of users signs on to the Cloud simultaneously and sets up
their workstations. Recent engineering and research efforts, such as applications of the
BitTorrent protocol [5] and de-duplication techniques [17], may be able to lessen some of
the workload imposed by the correlation of network traffic. Some bandwidth savings have
come from prior research on remote file systems which send only updated file portions in
network writes, instead of whole files [14]. Version control software operates in a similar
manner, updating files with differences since the last version. Many software ideas are
available, and with the software design and hardware supply, industry can address these
bandwidth spikes.
An early, visible concern for all joining organizations is operating on Cloud data in a
disconnected state. For example, if the domain nps.edu is physically disconnected from
the Internet by accident or malice, the workers at NPS still have to do their best to work
with data within cloud://nps.edu as it is disconnected from the rest of the Cloud. More
commonly, some workers will likely wish to do some work “Offline,” syncing their work
back to the Cloud when they are next able to get a network connection. Versioned storage
can aid this greatly, as the update history is visible on reconnecting. This use of versioning
is common in disconnected software development.
An integral part of the file system is an application programming interface (API) for
setting security definitions. This API must implement passive, automatic checks that an
ACL modification adheres to DoD and domain policy. The interface also must be caller-
agnostic (e.g. be able to interact with multiple email client applications), to prevent vendor
lock-in. Finally, versioning within the file system should provide for both accidental deletion
protection3, and for “Lazy” revocation4. Industry should provide an effective interface for
versioning, likely drawn from research and production file systems that provide versioning
systems, and source code management systems.
4 Milestones for an organization joining the DoD Cloud
We outline here some more concrete steps for individual organizations to take towards this
milestone, presenting logistical and technical challenges in a migration to the Cloud as
3“A [snapshot] is useful even if it is kept for just a few hours, because users usually notice immediately
when they have removed an important file” [7].
4“Lazy” revocation revokes access to a file at and after a certain time.
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outlined before [4]. The migration we present includes a “Staging” phase for organizations
that will join the Cloud.
4.1 Milestone: Virtualizing local storage
This milestone is complete when user desktops only use their local hard drives (if any)
as caching devices necessary for local computation. The primary storage is in a data
center, perhaps small and local to the building. Getting to this point involves deploying a
mandatory security architecture.
The virtual desktop environment is a major, early milestone for transition. Because one
goal is more carefully administering the storage infrastructure, an intermediary milestone
is acclimating users to using no local storage. Providing, or even mandating, the use of
network shared volumes gets users to adjust their workflows to the new storage paradigm.
On the technical-administrative side, we propose that all this storage will not start in
the Cloud. For an office of 1,000 users, it is reasonable to start by using a storage array
local to the building. As the transition to a federal cloud is completed, this storage array
can be repurposed as a local cache. Before that transition occurs, this gives the local
administrative group its chance to work out reliability and other issues, e.g. referencing
data within a cloud:// URI scheme.
4.2 Milestone: Adapting security infrastructure
This milestone is complete when a single sign-on system for desktop use, storage and
application access is deployed. The DoD must complete its specification for the minimum
amount of personnel information to be centrally reported and stored before this can start,
but it will support user administration with strong influence from personnel management
local to the organization.
Part of the transition to a Cloud is joining user-administrative information to a global
DoD personnel database. It is thus important for the user management information to nor-
malize to the identification and role definition requirements that will be spread throughout
DoD.
4.3 Milestone: Virtualize workflow and software
This milestone is complete when users are no longer bound to the applications or operating
system state on any particular workstation; work can even be on virtualized machines.
It also requires adaption of software presently critical to the organization, from desktop
applications (if any) to an interface accessible through the Cloud. This is equivalent to the
end of the Migration stage on the path to Cloud Nirvana [4].
Migrating data to the Cloud provides an opportunity for a revolution in improved
data integrity and versioning. Some applications will benefit from a well-specified data
layout, which can be specified with various software engineering principles [3]. If individual
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records are treated as objects, aggregations of those records can benefit from computer
science, databases and security research. Updating the records can follow a machine-
enforceable pattern, which grants automatic integrity protections, benefiting data security
in the manner of the Clark-Wilson security model of data integrity [2].
If aggregations are treated as sets of rules operating on data by reference, this enables
a form of file versioning amenable to distributed and offline work, known to file system
[7, 15], forensics [17] and software engineering [1] researchers and practitioners. Versioned
file system research enables space-efficient definitions of file systems at different points in
time by storing base images and small revisions. Distributed source control, such as in the
source code manager that enables distributed development of the Linux kernel [1], also takes
advantage of space-efficient data versioning (which has a side benefit of network efficiency).
Given an appropriately vetted data re-integration application, the Cloud can allow for
disconnected work when necessary. Recasting applications with these recommendations
is the Integration stage on the path to Cloud Nirvana, and completing and evolving the
applications is the final Unification stage [4].
4.4 Milestone: Joining building-local storage to the Cloud
Given the storage infrastructure acquired for a graduated integration, organizations that
take this approach will have an important array of storage available for a local cache.
Joining the Cloud will provide the last integration steps:
• Storage will have redundancy within the Cloud.
• Cloud applications, such as for administration, will be able to ease operations DoD
wide with a unified data store.
• Cloud DAC and reference passing will be fully available.
5 Conclusion
We outlined in this document steps for the three major enablers of the DoD Cloud. The
DoD policy specifications provide security interaction direction and high-level specifica-
tions for storage and sharing. The industry recommendations guide development efforts in
software and hardware infrastructure. Finally, the organization recommendations note the
progression towards joining the Cloud and unifying storage, applications and collaborations
across the DoD.
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